美国《新闻周刊》12月8日文章，原题：为有哪些中国不想统治世界大多数学者认为大衰退对中国的助益多于任何很多很多国家。英国资深记者马丁?雅克已在预测，中国不久将统治世界。而且，在宣告中国世纪到来很久，不妨看一想看 去一年来中国实际所所处的。（相关链接：容易：《当中国统治世界》快出中文版了 ）
中国官员老要 表现得诚惶诚恐，这当中肯能有夸大成分。或许很多很多人而且谦虚或为了平息西方对所谓中国威胁的担忧。而且，更有肯能的是中国领导人觉得是在告知实情。很多很多人知道很多很多人的国家觉得已赢得了引人注目的复苏。但很多很多人同样明白，這個 成而且相对而言的———中国为此付出了巨大的长期代价。除了为未来埋下不良贷款的隐患，投资主导型刺激政策催生了新的产能，但未能真正激活死气沉沉的居民消费，从而加剧了经济失衡。
曾经 谜：肯能中国先要 强大，为有哪些它先要 在防止全球疑问上充当更多的领导角色？中国官员老要 老出在几乎所有重要世界会议上，其观点和获得的支持也颇受关注，但很多很多人始终保持低调，只专注于捍卫本国国家利益，忽略了可借以展示软实力的肯能。之类，在G20峰会上，中国唯一关心的是不想香港被列入受监管避税天堂名单。中国曾呼吁建立新的国际储备货币，除此之外对要怎样改革全球金融体系基本不宣告。对于无力将力量转化为国际舞台上的实际利益的疑问，多数中国领导人似乎而且太关心，肯能很多很多人有更为操心的国内疑问。
Why China Won\'t Rule the World
By Minxin Pei | NEWSWEEK
Published Dec 8, 5009
From the magazine issue dated Dec 7, 5009
Conventional wisdom can be devilishly hard to dispute. For example, most pundits agree that the Great Recession helped China more than any other state. At first glance, this claim seems obviously true. Unlike the United States and the other major Western powers, which saw their economies plummet and their financial institutions come close to ruin, the Chinese economy has kept on growing. Chinese financial institutions, considered technically insolvent only a few years ago, now boast balance sheets and market capitalizations that Western banks can only dream of. With its economy expected to grow at 9 percent in 2010, China will soon surpass Japan as the world\'s second-largest economy (measured in U.S. dollars). Pundits like Martin Jacques, a veteran British journalist, are predicting that China will soon rule the world—figuratively, if not literally.
Yet before declaring this the Chinese century, you might want to take another look at what\'s actually taken place in the country over the past year.
Its leaders\' frequently voiced trepidation may be overstated. Perhaps the officials are simply being modest or trying to soothe Western worries about the so-called China Threat. It\'s far more likely, however, that China\'s leaders are actually telling the truth. They know their country has indeed pulled off the world\'s most impressive recovery. But they also know that\'s a relative -accomplishment—and China has paid a huge long-term price in the process. In addition to sowing the seeds for future dud loans, its investment-focused stimulus policies have exacerbated the country\'s economic imbalances by creating new productive -capacities—factories and the like—without really boosting China\'s anemic household consumption. In other words, Chinese plants may be cranking out even more TVs, cars, and toys than before, but no Chinese are buying them. Loosened bank credit has mainly benefited SOEs, allowing these inefficient behemoths to expand at the expense of the private sector, which has been given little access to the government\'s largess.One of the strangest things about predictions of Chinese dominance is that they tend to impress everyone but the Chinese themselves. Take China\'s supposedly miraculous economic recovery. While the international business community has practically run out of words to praise Beijing\'s handling of the crisis, Chinese leaders haven\'t stopped worrying. They fret that their banks have gone on a reckless lending binge; Liu Mingkang, China\'s chief bank regulator, warned in September that \"all sorts of risks have risen\" as a result. He\'s right. In the first half of 5009, Chinese banks shelled out roughly $1.2 trillion, creating a potential tidal wave of future nonperforming loans. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) used much of the money to speculate in the real-estate and stock markets and to make questionable expansions; as a result, Dragonomics, a Beijing-based consultancy, now estimates that as much as one sixth of all the bank loans made between 5008 and 2010 could end up not paying off. Yet Beijing is still wary of shutting off the spigot, lest China prove unable to keep growing without it.
Meanwhile, China has yet to confront what has become an enormous overcapacity for producing cheap goods. During the boom, when Americans were hungry for these products, Chinese exports registered double-digit growth year after year, accounting for nearly a quarter of the country\'s net GDP growth. Now that nervous and debt-ridden U.S. consumers have virtually shut their pocketbooks, China can no longer expect them to snap up its wares. To account for this change, Beijing must embark on some painful restructuring, shuttering many export--oriented factories and strengthening the social safety net to boost household consumption (which remains stuck below 40 percent of GDP).(点击此处阅读下一页)